Gender in a Box? The Paradoxes of Recognition beyond the Gender Binary by Aboim, Sofia
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 231–241
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i3.2820
Article
Gender in a Box? The Paradoxes of Recognition beyond the Gender Binary
Sofia Aboim
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, 1600–189 Lisbon, Portugal; E-Mail: sofia.aboim@ics.ulisboa.pt
Submitted: 27 January 2020 | Accepted: 10 July 2020 | Published: 18 September 2020
Abstract
The growing visibility of trans and gender-nonconforming individuals paved the way for a novel politics of transgender
recognition in the legal sphere and state-governed public policies. Considering that the possibilities for registering multi-
ple genders beyond male or female are taking effect in several countries, this article examines recent developments and
claims that recognition is complicit with misrecognition for two main reasons. Firstly, because models of recognition tend
to equalize all the interactions and all the fields of social life. Drawing on Axel Honneth’s notion of spheres of recogni-
tion, I argue that inasmuch as different forms of recognition (legal, moral, affective) are governed by different norms and
gender regimes, the dynamics of recognition produce misrecognition. Secondly, because legal and institutional recogni-
tion tends to reify individual identity. Drawing on Nancy Fraser’s critique of the identity model of recognition, I contend
that the identity recognition model tends to impose a norm rather than recognizing diversity. Therefore, gender identity
categories can—through a process of reification—block the entitlement to affirm one’s self-determined gender identity.
The paradoxical dynamics of recognition are empirically illustrated through an analysis of third-gender markers and their
effects upon the lives and narratives of trans and gender-nonconforming individuals. By examining the case of Nepal in
comparative perspective with other developments in Asia and South America, it is demonstrated that the identity model
of recognition is complicit with feelings and practices of misrecognition.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, gender identity gained centre-stage as
a growing number of individuals claimed the right to
a gender identity outside the binary model that op-
poses male and female. However, while the emergent
visibility of trans, gender-nonconforming, gender non-
binary or intersex people paved the way for reframing
gender citizenship afar from the medicalized model of
transsexuality first established by endocrinologist Harry
Benjamin in the 1950s (Baisely, 2016; Dunne, 2017), the
political inroad to transgender recognition remains filled
with controversy (Powell, Shapiro, & Stein, 2016; Sky,
2018). Reconciling freedom for self-determining one’s
own gender with state-sponsored governance of offi-
cial gender identities beyond masculine or feminine has
been an arduous struggle. If the state often fails to recog-
nize gender diversity and renders people’s lives ‘admin-
istratively impossible’ (borrowing Dean Spade’s expres-
sion [Spade, 2015, p. 12]), within the transgender and
non-binary activist movements, the consensus remains
absent. Trans activism is fractured (Halberstam, 2018,
p. 12). For some, gender should be simply abolished
and legal categories rendered unnecessary (Davis, 2017).
For others, ‘transgendering recognition’ is a central goal
of transgender and gender-nonconforming claims for
rights (Juang, 2013). Ideally, as Judith Butler argued
(Butler & Williams, 2014, p. 1), “one should be free to
determine the course of one’s gendered life,” even if as,
as Butler also notes, while “some want to be gender-
free…others want to be free really to be a gender that
is crucial to who they are.” However, while transforming
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gender classification systems is key, legal and adminis-
trative strategies to move beyond binary categories of
gender and regulating gender difference aremultifarious
(Clarke, 2019).
The recent wave of legalization of third-gender or
no-gender markers by some states across the globe
generated upheaval. Whereas ideals of a postgendered
or genderless society encountered contestation (Sky,
2018), the state-controlled multiplication of official gen-
der markers designed to accommodate diverse gender
identifications gained pace. Indeed, the legal recognition
of non-binary gender markers by the state (whether X
in Australia or Denmark, Diverse in Germany, Others in
India or Nepal) is often interpreted as a victory for the
trans rights movement (Young, 2016). Notwithstanding,
critical scholarship has, since long, criticized state cate-
gorizations and the ways official markers serve to gov-
ern difference in ways that perpetuate unjustness (e.g.,
Foucault, 1988). After all, although representing a revo-
lutionary advance, the gender neutrality of a X marker
can bemore apparent than real. After all, neutral gender
markers lend themselves to categorical interpretations
that ‘third-gender’ and ‘third-sex’ (Dembroff & Wodak,
2018, p. 386) trans and gender non-binary individuals as
pertaining to the supplementary category of a ternary
gender system of classification.
Problems with the articulation of gender identity
laws, gender-neutral classifications and, specifically, le-
gal third-gender markers have been particularly high-
lighted (Bochenek & Knight, 2012; Knight, Flores, &
Nezhad, 2015). After all, present-day legal forms of recog-
nition might also foster reification and marginalization
(Markard, 2018). However, although current state re-
sponses are most often frowned upon and third-gender
markers deemed complicit with binary norms of gen-
der (e.g., Nisar, 2018), legal restrictions enforced by bi-
nary categorization schemes continue to be denounced
as harmful (Davis, 2017; Monro, 2005; Salamon, 2010;
Spade, 2008).
If current strategies for transgender recognition
generate misrecognition and perpetuate discrimination
(Fine, Torrea, Frost, & Cabana, 2018), the lack of recog-
nition denies the social existence of the person and
compromises any positive effects of increased visibility
(Juang, 2013). Therefore, state-endorsed recognition of
gender diversity is still limited and potentiallymisleading.
While solutions for recognizing gender-nonconforming
individuals remain under heated debate, reconciling cat-
egorization (through the addition of third or seemingly
neutral gender markers) with the entitlement to pub-
licly display and affirm one’s own self-defined gender
identity is a difficult endeavour. Hence, even if we ad-
mit that legal categories are not suited to accommo-
date people’s subjective identification, the rift between
claims for recognition and pleas for the abolition of gen-
der markers suggests that we need to further reflect on
the concept of recognition. While recognition is simulta-
neously a normative regulative ideal and a descriptive
tool (McNay, 2008, p. 2), my focus remains mainly de-
scriptive as I seek to understand the paradoxes of recog-
nition brought about by the recent legal officialization of
third-gender markers.
Although there is an evident ‘recognition gap’
(Lamont, 2018) caused by the inability of institutions
to provide sufficient recognition of gender identity, the
gap argument is not sufficient to understand why mis-
recognition is systematically perpetuated, even when in-
creased dynamics of institutional recognition are taking
place (Aboim, 2020). My central argument asserts that
the politics of recognition is complicit with misrecogni-
tion for two main reasons. Firstly, because models of
recognition tend to equalize all the interactions and all
the fields of social life. Drawing on Axel Honneth’s notion
of spheres of recognition, I argue that inasmuch as dif-
ferent forms of recognition (legal, moral, affective) are
governed by different normative principles and belong
to different gender regimes, the dynamics of recognition
work in ways that produce misrecognition. Secondly, be-
cause legal and institutional recognition tends to reify in-
dividual identity. In conversation with Nancy Fraser’s cri-
tique of the identity model of recognition, I contend that
the identification of gender minorities through a specific
gender marker is shown to generate misrecognition. The
problem is that the identity recognition model tends to
impose a norm rather than recognizing diversity, thereby
compromising the politics of respectful difference ini-
tially sought after. Therefore, paradoxically, gender iden-
tity categories can—through a process of reification—
block the entitlement to affirm one’s self-determined
gender identity.
Recent debates and legal solutions for the official-
ization and institutionalization of third-gender mark-
ers illustrate the paradoxical dynamics of recognition.
If state regulation of gender difference garnered criti-
cal debate, less attention has been given to the value,
whether instrumental or symbolic, of third-gender cate-
gories for gender-nonconforming individuals, especially
outside Europe and North America. Aiming to narrow
this gap, my argument is empirically illustrated by a qual-
itative study that combined document analysis of legal
and institutional developments with in-depth interviews
with trans and gender-nonconforming individuals. By ex-
amining the case of Nepal and the narratives of Nepali
trans migrants in Europe, I seek to demonstrate that the
identity model of recognition produces practices of mis-
recognition. Although the Nepali case is singled out, find-
ings are interpreted in comparison with developments in
Asia and South America and carry important lessons to
the European context.
2. Paradoxes of Recognition
In the current battles for transgender recognition,
heated arguments have fuelled the divide between sup-
porters of state-endorsed third-gender markers and the
abolition of public interference on the private experience
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of gender. The debate brought the problem of recogni-
tion to the forefront of the discussion, with some argu-
ing in favour and others against political and institutional
recognition (Halberstam, 2018). Therefore, although the
critical analysis of recognition is not new, a more produc-
tive approach implies addressing the paradoxical charac-
ter of recognition. In order to understand how misrecog-
nition is implicated in every act of recognition, I advance
two central arguments for explaining the paradoxes of
recognition. Firstly, each sphere of recognition is differ-
ent and works according to its own particular norms and
gender regimes. Secondly, the identity model underpin-
ning present-day recognition politics forcefully catego-
rizes people inways that constrain their freedomandpro-
duce reification (Fraser, 2000).
2.1. The Spheres of Recognition: Moral and Legal
Disjunctions
Current formulations of minority political agendas are
greatly indebted to Charles Taylor’s theorization of recog-
nition. In a nutshell, Taylor demonstrated that the univer-
sal entitlement to equality is reconcilable with the right
to difference and that the specific importance of recogni-
tion lies in its relationship to identity, which he defined
as “a person’s understanding of who they are, of their
fundamental characteristics as a human being” (Taylor &
Gutmann, 1994, p. 25). The politics of transgender recog-
nition has not been an exception and also sought inspi-
ration in Taylor’s formulation (Juang, 2013; Taylor, 1992).
After all, the struggle to freely self-determine one’s own
gender identity is anchored in a politics of difference in
which the uniqueness of each individual must be recog-
nized (Hines, 2013).
Approaches to recognition awarded little attention
to Axel Honneth’s landmark contribution (Honneth,
1995, 2008), when, in fact, Honneth’s multidimensional
theorization of different spheres of recognition is ex-
tremely helpful to understand the shortcomings of recog-
nition politics (Aboim, 2020). More than a recognition
gap that institutions would be able to fulfil, with the
right amount of investment, the failures of recognition
might not be so easily fixed and the reasons behind
it signal one central problem: The fact that the dy-
namics of recognition tend to equalize very different
forms of recognition. However, given that each social
sphere is governed by a different principle of recogni-
tion and belongs to a different regime of power (gender
regime in the case), this equalization is problematic. For
this reason, Honneth’s theorization helps us understand
the problem.
In a recent interview, Honneth claimed that “the fo-
cus on an analysis of society has turned the three [love,
rights and solidarity] original forms of recognition into
five” (Willig & Honneth, 2012, p. 148). In the aftermath
of the theoretical dialogue with Nancy Fraser, Honneth
(2014) distinguished between legal and moral recogni-
tion, and three institutional spheres of practice: personal
relationships, mutual satisfaction of needs, and commu-
nicative will-formation. For my current purpose, I will
hold on to the distinction between legal and moral so-
cial spheres of recognition, which Honneth respectively
equates with the state-of-law and institutionalized indi-
vidualism, that is, organized self-realization.
Moral recognition implicates the right to self-
determination and self-esteem achieved through inter-
subjective mutual recognition. For Honneth (2014), sub-
jects are constituted by acts of recognition from which
they derive self-worth and the very possibility of exis-
tence. Hence, the primary form of recognition is neces-
sarily moral. Any act of non-recognition or misrecogni-
tion generates, at the very least, vulnerability, if not the
deprivation of agency. As Honneth explains, “human be-
ings are vulnerable in the specific manner we call ‘moral’
because they owe their identity to the construction of
a practical self-relation that is, from the beginning, de-
pendent upon the help and affirmation of other human
beings” (Honneth, 1995, p. 51). However, moral recogni-
tion (ultimately, self-determination) is not independent
of the self-respect achieved through rights within the
legal sphere. The possibility of identity realization de-
pends on both moral and legal principles, which can
only be achieved intersubjectively. Moral recognition
would ultimately depend on being granted respect by
the state-of-law. Equal legal standing would imply rights
and, more importantly, the moral value of difference
and respect. The problem is that moral entitlement to
identity and difference and legal recognition enforced
by the state-of-law are often strange bedfellows. In the
case of trans recognition, recent research (e.g., Scherpe,
2017) proved that, in most cases, there is an evident in-
congruity between the moral and the legal or, in other
words, the subjective dimension of the self and the regu-
latory dimension where institutional practices of mutual
recognition take effect (e.g., Fraser, 2000).
Indisputably, as Nancy Fraser (2000, p. 280) con-
tended: “Misrecognition is an institutional social rela-
tion not a psychological state.” Indeed, institutional reg-
ulations often collide with personal feelings of gender
authenticity. Furthermore, the fact that each sphere of
recognition belongs to different regimes within the gen-
der order—what Connell defines as “the current state
of play in the macro-politics of gender” (Connell, 1987,
p. 20)—reinforces the disjunction between the different
social spheres. For Connell, a gender regime refers to the
state of play of gender relations in a given institution. For
example, state regulation, and symbolic relations consti-
tute different regimes within a system of hierarchically
formed positions (Connell, 1987).
By suggesting that (1) moral entitlement to differ-
ence does not always accord with group forged identity
claims, and that (2) norms and institutional regulations
governing different spheres of recognition are often ir-
reconcilable, I content that recognition is paradoxical.
Such paradoxes necessarily weight upon political strate-
gies of recognition.
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2.2. Identity Recognition and the Limits of Categories
Conceptualizing recognition as necessarily fragmented
and subjugated to the often-irreconcilable norms and
dynamics of different spheres of social life helps us to
make sense of a second argument. That is the problem
of identity. As Nancy Fraser already argued, “by equat-
ing the politics of recognition with identity politics, it
encourages both the reification of group identities and
the displacement of redistribution” (Fraser, 2000, p. 110).
Similarly, McNay contends that any quest for the authen-
ticity of the self produces essentialist accounts of identity
(McNay, 2008, pp. 64–66), that is, the struggle for being
recognized as one’s own self tends to produce reification.
Taylor had responded to the critique of unintended iden-
titarianism by defending a politics of difference premised
upon what he saw as “a universal respect for the human
capacity to formone’s identity” (Taylor&Gutmann, 1994,
p. 42). The reification of identity categories and the en-
suing dismissal of difference in the strategies of identity
politics remained problematic.
Indeed, the emphasis on recognition, as the result of
an intersubjective experience transferred from themoral
to the legal sphere, has been the cornerstone of identity
politics. However, although identity politics is often par-
alleled with a ‘politics of difference’ (Massoumi, 2015),
the moral right to difference has barely been mirrored in
legal developments. As many advert (see Juang, 2013),
most frequently, one particular identity that belongs to
just a fewmight become predominant and is extended to
the whole group. Diversity is then swept under the rug.
Even if for long identitarian sameness has been harshly
criticized (Young, 1990, p. 159), the tension between
a common political identity and the respect for differ-
ence seems irresolvable. Ideally, the identity of a person
ought to be the basis of politics and justice. Nevertheless,
this is barely the reality. This paradoxical dynamic occurs
whether misrecognition results from the absence of ap-
preciation by others of one’s identity (Taylor & Gutmann,
1994, p. 25) or, as Honneth adverts, fromhumiliation and
disrespect enacted by others, institutions and the state
(Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 134).
In a perfect model of recognition, individuals would
be given the capacity to decide who they are and act ac-
cordingly to realize their identity in and across different
social spheres. However, a category of identity tends to
generate a norm that includes certain traits and excludes
others. If this category intends to recognize a specific
identity, then itmight block individuals’ subjective under-
standings of who they are or want to become, while forc-
ing people to articulate an exterior identity thatmight be
forced upon them. That is to say, an exterior categorical
identity that serves the interest of the state and enables
renewed forms of classification to emerge. This peril has
been a cornerstone in the poststructuralist deconstruc-
tionist critical contribution. As Butler alerted, following
Foucault’s insights, identity categories “are never merely
descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclu-
sionary” (Butler, 1997, p. 16). In this sense, gender mark-
ers are more than words or semantic propositions. Like
any other categories, they enable and disable, creating
challenges to be considered in the struggle for trans
recognition that must necessarily be measured against
the empirical reality of practice.
Largely, the problem rests with the dubious charac-
ter of gender categories, which seem both reductionist
and indispensable, not only for reasons of intelligibility
but also for the pursuit of justice through the politics of
identity. But whenever one deconstructs, the most prob-
able outcome is the multiplication of the categorical in-
roads to diversity. From the start, the process of break-
ing falsely constructed homogeneities is tense and un-
finished. Already a long time ago, Ken Plummer had re-
sumed this difficulty quite neatly (1981, p. 29):
The root issue is to grasp the way in which the world
is simultaneously necessarily contingent upon orderly
categories through which we may grasp it and how
simultaneously such categories inevitably restrict our
experiences and serve material forces of domination
and control. We cannot live without them but living
with them is a horror! Categorization is paradoxical: It
aids and destroys.
Categorization, even in the form of a gender marker,
might be necessary, but it is also dangerous. One ma-
jor risk would be obliterating some identities and claims
by imposing a hierarchy of legitimacy, which normatively
separates the insiders from the outsiders. Then, instead
of a form of tactical strategic essentialism, to borrow
Spivak’s (1985) landmark concept, the likelihood of im-
posing a particular, and necessarily narrow, discourse
on the right form of trans identity would be consider-
able. One important consequence of any narrow inter-
pretation of trans identities would be the erasure or
distortion of some forms of gender expression. For in-
stance, as Viviane Namaste (2005) pointed out, the cat-
egory transsexual is being gradually erased from public
arenas. As Dietz (2018) points out, the ‘wrong body’ nar-
rative still shapes legal provisions and limits the effect
of identity self-declaration for many trans and gender-
nonconforming individuals. Conversely, the visibility of
transgender individuals in and from non-Western soci-
eties feeds the imaginaries of exotic third-gender groups
(Towle & Morgan, 2006), thereby reproducing the di-
vide between the ‘west and the rest’. Furthermore, the
complicity between third-gender laws and the protec-
tion of patriarchy often reproduces patterns of marginal-
ization that set gender-nonconforming individuals apart
as non-normative and pathological, as demonstrated by
Nisar (2018) for the case of Pakistan. For that reason,
adopting the legal third-gender can contribute to social
marginalization, reinforcement of stereotypes andworse
economic conditions. All erasures and distortions pro-
mote then the de-ontologization of subjects, sacrificing
the entitlement to difference for the sake of a collective
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identity, which too often only very partially produces a
positive recognition of difference.
Revising recognition, and, above all, for comprehend-
ing the paradoxes of the model of identity recognition,
is thus vital for rethinking the possibilities of realiza-
tion of a gender identity politics. The fact is that insti-
tutionalized (neo-liberal) individualism is difficult to rec-
oncile with identity claims. On the one hand, neoliberal
forms of governance promote the value of individual-
ism against collective organization (or resistance). On the
other hand, however, the normalization of identities to
fit the patterns of mainstream culture is also encour-
aged (e.g., Richardson, 2017). Recognition comes with
an effective price, considering that increased visibility
might not correspond to increased respect for difference
(Gossett, Stanley, & Burton, 2017).
Although gender identity is vital for many individuals
(e.g., Butler & Williams, 2014), political models of iden-
tity recognition remain problematic. The multiple sub-
jectivities, expressions and performances of gender dif-
ference do not necessarily form a common identity in
the strong sense of the term. Agreeing with Nancy Fraser
(2001), the commonelementwould be the fact that trans
and gender-nonconforming individuals share the same
status of subalternity. Themain difficulty is that the iden-
tity model of recognition tends to produce misrecogni-
tion, a disjunction between different social spheres and
the reification of normative identities.
In the section that follows, I briefly contextualize
the expansion of third-gender markers and how activist
claims have been reinterpreted in legal developments
and institutional policies.
3. Legal Thirdness: Officialising Gender beyond
the Binary
In recent years, international law gradually increased the
regulation of gender diversity (Plummer, 2015). Pressure
from trans rights activists and organizations has undoubt-
edly triggered the change produced by state agencies
in gender classification systems (Waites, 2009). Back
in 2007, the Yogyakarta Principles had already estab-
lished that recognition before the law of each person’s
self-defined gender identity was a fundamental human
right. A decade later, Principle 31 of The Yogyakarta
Principles Plus 10 (2017) recommended that sex and gen-
der markers should only be legally registered for a legit-
imate purpose. More: Sex and gender markers should
accommodate multiple options through legal provisions
and institutional mechanisms that “recognise and af-
firm each person’s self-defined gender identity” (The
Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10, 2017, p. 9). Ideally, how-
ever, Principle 31 established that the right to legal recog-
nition should not require any reference to or disclo-
sure of “sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity, gender expression or sex characteristics.” In 2018,
Transgender Europe endorsed Principle 31, “calling for
the full abolition of gender markers on official iden-
tity documents.” Activists’ commitment to transgender
recognition is not entirely opposed to gender abolition-
ist claims. After all, multiple gender marker optionsmust
eventually be eliminated from identification documents
and bureaucratic procedures. The groundswell of trans
rights refuelled the hopes of reconstructing gender clas-
sification schemes afresh (McQueen, 2015).
However, rather than moving towards the full or, at
least, extensive legal elimination of gender markers, law-
makers responded by expanding the binary classification
through the addition of a third-gender category (even if
concomitantly eliminating sex or gender from some doc-
uments and procedures). Until now, a small but growing
number of countries followed this route.
Although gender identity laws are today in place in
more than forty countries, third-gender markers (Holzer,
2018) are available in a smaller number of countries
and regions. Whether more or less neutral, third-gender
markers are being applied in different ways, even if al-
ways within a ternary system of classification (M and
F plus X, Diverse, Other, etc.). The new gender marker
might cover only intersex people, like in the case of
Germany. The changes recently implemented inGermany
motivated reactions of disappointment (Transgender
Europe, 2019), inasmuch as the majority of non-binary
people remain excluded from third-gender markers. In
fact, following the decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany in 2017, the German parliament com-
mitted to either abolishing the requirement to register
gender at birth or creating additional gender options.
However, the third-gender option (divers) announced in
August 2018 and made official in January 2019 is avail-
able only to people with intersex variance.
Conversely, a second model might include all people
who identify with a non-binary gender, but normally with
restrictions. In Australia, which pioneered the expansion
of the gender binary classification system in 2002, the ap-
plication of the legal right to a non-binary identity is lim-
ited insofar as the majority of government services con-
tinues to offer only M and F gender marker options and
a medical certificate is required (Australian Government,
2015). Systemic discrimination explains, therefore, the
low uptake for gender ‘X’ passports, which amounts to
just 110, since they became available in 2002 (Pollock,
2018). Similarly, in Malta, only one gender ‘X’ passport
was issued since September 2017,when the third-gender
marker ‘X’ was legally introduced. In some cases, like
New York among many other examples, territorial gaps
in legislation are problematic. Since 2019, X gendermark-
ers are available in New York City, whereas the State of
New York does not allow for non-binary classifications.
In some cases, the expansion of gender markers might
be exceptional and prospective. Countries, like France,
Ireland or The Netherlands, have already issued gender-
neutral passports even if legal provisions are yet un-
der debate.
In countries with indigenous traditions of a third-
gender category (that is, gender identities that do not fall
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exclusively in man/male or woman/female categories;
for an overview, see Darwin, 2017; Nanda, 2000), like
India (2009), Pakistan, (2009) or Nepal (2007), official
recognition of those who are neither man nor woman
might foster the mainstreaming of an institutionalized
‘disability’ (Hossain, 2017, p. 9). In effect, activists’ con-
testation of third-gender laws in places as different as
Australia or Germany and India or Nepal—which have
been frequently mediatized as progressive (e.g., Young,
2016)—emphasized that ‘third classifications’ (whether
explicitly Other or even coded X or Indeterminate) might
contribute to strengthening the gender binary (Council
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015). In
truth, the third-gender recognition model might confer
legal protection and enable affirmative action while con-
currently sanctioning a limited recognition of gender di-
versity that faces the perils of stereotypization. One ex-
emplary case is Nepal.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Nepal delivered
a breakthrough pronouncement (Bochenek & Knight,
2012, p. 2). Ruling out all medical requirements, the
court’s rule responded to claims of the Blue Diamond
Society, a Nepali LGBTI rights organization led by Sunil
Babu Pant and established a third-gender category
(Other) “under which female third-gender, male third-
gender and intersexual are grouped, as per the con-
cerned person’s self-feeling” (Sunil Babu Pant and
Others v. Nepal Government and Others, 2008, p. 281).
Alongside the conflation of sex, gender identity and sex-
ual orientation in a single ‘O’ category, de facto recogni-
tion is extremely problematic. As Chhetri (2017, p. 108)
notes, “in Nepal, third-gender persons are visible in hu-
man right documents, given equal rights in legal spheres
but at the same time they are ignored and neglected in
implementations of those rights.” A 2013 survey (Knight
et al., 2015) showed that very few individuals had access
to the official third-gendermarker. Only five respondents
had successfully changed their citizenship documents.
In this battlefield, distrust from any form of state-
endorsed regulation is reasonable, with the solution
residing for many activists and scholars in the undo-
ing of all gender classifications (Stryker, 2019), as the
only way to disassemble a society in which hospitals,
prisons or toilettes and bureaucratic forms are gender-
segregated (Davis, 2017). Notwithstanding, the absence
of third-gender official regulations might increase the
harmful effect of non-recognition and misrecognition.
As a double-edged sword, increased visibility has led
to an escalating of violence against trans and gender
non-conforming people (Gossett et al., 2017). According
to the Trans Murder Monitoring project (Transgender
Europe & Balzer, 2020), between January 2008 and
September 2019, 3,314 trans and gender-diverse were
reported worldwide to have been killed.
In yet another group of countries, the governance
of gender-nonconforming populations has not escaped
state power and forms of unofficial or semi-official reg-
ulation were established. One such example is Brazil.
While violence against gender-nonconforming individ-
uals is endemic (in Brazil alone, 1,368 trans people
were murdered since 2008), travestis are separated
from other inmates in Brazilian prisons (Ferreira, 2015).
Thailand is another exemplary case. Although politi-
cal efforts to recognize a third-gender category are al-
ready visible, transgender people (kathoeys) are nor-
mally exempted from army duty or allocated sepa-
rated dorms or toilettes (United Nations Development
Programme, 2018). In sum, whether states opt for the
official creation of gender categories beyond the binary
or semi-official protection strategies, the governance of
gender-nonconforming individuals implicates the state
and forms of institutionalmanagement.Whether further
legal recognition framed under a human rights paradigm
will be able to award individuals truly inclusive gender
citizenship remains a problem (Baisely, 2016).
Most often, regulation comes with a price, as
Halberstam (2018, p. 47) alerted. A model of the of-
ficial trans person, most often ignoring all forms of
intersectional disadvantage, materializes swiftly to the
detriment of plural claims and identities (Spade, 2013).
Furthermore, as argued byMcQueen (2015), recognition,
and legal recognition in particular, can produce both en-
abling and disabling effects. While even themost encom-
passing models of gender identity suffer from a recogni-
tion gap that institutional policies are unable to close up,
misrecognition is a more structural and profound conse-
quence. Recognition tends to produce misrecognition.
The analysis of the effects of third-gender categories
for gender-nonconforming people might help us shed
further light on the dilemmas of trans politics. In the com-
ing section, we will learn more about the production of
misrecognition in legal and social practice.
4. Third-Gender Markers: Misrecognition in Practice
The production of a given gender category, as in any
other identity formation, often results from and leads to
processes of simplification and reification. Third-gender
markers are particularly relevant to my analysis. For
that reason, in this section, I will focus on the poten-
tial effects of third-gender legal solutions for gender-
nonconforming individuals by examining how normative
prescriptions block individuals’ realization of their gen-
der identity. Two difficulties become evident. Firstly, how
legal and institutional categories of gender become em-
bedded in social life and affect practices of mutual recog-
nition in other spheres, and, secondly, how certain for-
mulations of identity crystallize and become reified.
My analysis draws on a qualitative study that com-
bined the examination of legal and institutional docu-
ments and in-depth interviews with trans and gender-
nonconforming people in five European countries over
the course of the past three years: Portugal, France, the
United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Sweden. In to-
tal, 160 in-depth interviews were carried out with in-
dividuals with different gender identifications and var-
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ious national origins. More than 40 percent of par-
ticipants (69) self-defined beyond the gender binary,
whether as non-binary, genderqueer, bigender, agen-
der, genderfluid or as crossdresser, travesti, two-spirit,
kathoey, third-gender, among other identifications. One-
third (53) of the participants are migrants, the majority
of which from South America (21) and Asia (14). Of these,
15 individuals came from Brazil, 7 from Nepal and 4 from
Thailand. In all the remaining cases, only one individual
came from each country.
Nepal, Brazil and Thailand share what Nanda (2000)
called an indigenous tradition of the third-gender and
all are stage to trans and gender-nonconforming activist
movements. However, while both Brazil and Thailand
implemented institutional policies to govern gender dif-
ference in specific settings (such as prisons or dorms,
as aforementioned), only Nepal put into effect a legal
third-gender solution. Therefore, the case of Nepal—
examined from a comparative perspective—enabled me
to further explore the contradictions of third-gender le-
gal solutions. Aside from the opportunity of interview-
ing Nepali trans-migrants in Portugal and the United
Kingdom, which offered precious insights into individ-
uals’ views on third-gender legal options, two reasons
underpinned this option. Firstly, alongside a number of
South Asian countries, Nepal was a legal frontrunner
in matters of third-gender legislation, and while we of-
ten centre our attention in western developments many
pioneering changes are taking place in other parts of
the globe. Secondly, although Nepal represents a very
specific model of legal recognition, where all trans and
gender-nonconforming individuals must fit the Other
gender marker option, themore detailed analysis of how
Nepali participantswere (or not) affected by the lawhigh-
lights vital problems of official gender categories. The
narratives of Brazilian and Thai participants will serve as
a benchmark.
In both the United Kingdom and Portugal (where the
interviews took place), trans and gender-nonconforming
British and Portuguese nationals are divided between
solutions that fully, or at least partially, abolish gender
markers and solutions that enforce a ternary classifica-
tion system, with a neutral form of gender added to the
F andM boxes. The findings closely follow those of other
studies (e.g. Rodrigues, 2019; Valentine, 2016). Among
the Nepali interviewees, only one participant identified
as third-gender. All others preferred terms such as trans,
transgender or transsexual. Nonehad changed their legal
gender. In comparison, nine Brazilian and two Thai par-
ticipants identified as neither man nor woman, whether
as travesti, kathoey or non-binary. Participants were re-
cruited by various means (personal contacts, participa-
tion in events, networks associated with trans rights or-
ganizations) and a snow-ball method was used. All par-
ticipants were provided with detailed information about
the aims and procedures of the study and were cog-
nizant that their participation was voluntary and could
be withdrawn at any moment. The terms of confiden-
tiality and use of the information gathered in the in-
terview were outlined. It was made clear that results
would be reported in such away that no individual would
be identifiable.
Let us examine the limitations of legal recognition to
illustrate how the disjunction between moral and legal
spheres and the reification of identity.
The Nepali one-suit-all third-gender category might
represent a move towards progress in matters of state
recognition, but the ternary system of gender classifi-
cation is not able to include everyone. Firstly, because
the gendermarkerOthers,while representing a historical
and cultural notion of the existing third-gender, might, as
a result, conflate too many sub-categories. The 2013 sur-
vey demonstrated that respondents identified with mul-
tiple identity terms related to both their gender identity
and sexual orientation.While 43.9 percent of the respon-
dents self-identified as third-gender (using terms such
as ‘Meti,’ ‘Kothi,’ ‘Hijara,’ ‘Third-gender,’ ‘Transgender’),
more than half preferred other terms, from gay and les-
bian to men and women to trans and transgender. The
legal Other category, though interpreted as enunciating
the third-gender, does not translate the multiplicity and
complexity of self-identification. Rather, it produces a
sort of a legal umbrella category that might distort indi-
viduals’ sense of who they are and what their gender is.
Indeed, for some, the third-gender option might not
be a solution. These are the cases of Alisha (35, transgen-
der woman) and Devna (29, transgender woman). Both
womenmigrated fromNepal and live in Lisbon at present.
As Alisha explains:
I feel that I don’t exist whether at home or here
in Europe. I don’t want to be the hijara but I’m no
woman either, they don’t let me. So who am I sup-
posed to be? I look mostly female, and I feel female,
but my passport is male, so it’s a nightmare. I can-
not change my legal sex to be a woman and I don’t’
want that other thing. I’m not Other! I’m just tired of
being so persecuted. There should be an alternative
for people like me….Like not having one face and a
different passport, why we need those documents?
I don’t want anyone to seemy identification until I can
change that. But I’mmeant to be awoman, I’mnot like
others. It’s fine, but it’s not me.
If freedom to check theM or F gender boxes is restricted,
producingwhatNamaste (2005) termedas the erasure of
the transsexual, for those who identify neither as a man
nor as a woman, being just Other can be felt like a form
of misrecognition. Maaya (26, third-gender/non-binary,
living in England) explained this feeling quite well:
I never thought I was a woman, I don’t think I’m a
woman. I never felt like aman either….Formany years,
I was just a gay boy, a meti, then I thought I might be a
third-gender, but never told anyone really. I was afraid
of what my family, my boss, my friends would do, it
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was difficult, and so I hide it. I’m still very afraid, but
here I went to a support group….They told me it’s ok,
that I’m non-binary, but I don’t know yet. I could be
third-gender, after all I’m not a true woman, I don’t
feel like a man, so I’m in the middle.
Interviewer: Would you like to change your gender in
legal documents in your home country?
Maybe, but not now. I don’t like that system, what’s
being other? I know we are just others, not at all re-
spected, not at all considered like who we are. I don’t
want my documents to say other or third-gender,
that’s bad. Maybe someday, we will have many gen-
ders and respect, and perhaps there is a better name
for us. For now, no, not in my country, and not here
too. I don’t think people understand us, especially
when you are a migrant they think the worst.
The excerpt of the conversation with Maaya is revealing
of how an identity category can distort one’s own sense
of gender authenticity. In fact, umbrella gender cate-
gories, whether legal or not,might create and feed identi-
ties that are unfitting and reifying.Whether specific third-
gender markers are on the table or non-binary recogni-
tion is under debate, the systems of gender categoriza-
tion might produce relevant forms of misrecognition.
While none of the seven Nepali participants had
legally changed their gender at the time of the interview,
the legal provision transformed the ways they felt others
perceived them in their home country. Sabita (33, trans-
gender woman, living in England for a year), who has al-
ways felt she was a woman even if she lived as a man for
many years, recalls that she felt constrained to conform
to a third-gender normativity that was expected of her.
Despite the enormous difficulties in accessing the rights
granted by the law, trans people like Sabita felt the pres-
sure to become Other in everyday life and institutional
settings. As Sabita sombrely narrates:
It’s difficult to have a job, a house, just a normal life
like everyone else when no one sees who you are, no
one cares about who you are. They think they know,
and just tell you can’t be this or that, they just put you
down. I had no job, no nothing. I had to leavemy coun-
try to become myself.
Interviewer: Did you feel at some point that the legal
changes in Nepal were changing things for the better?
Not really, not for me, or many people that I know.
Sometimes it was like if you had to fit a role and never
aspire to more, like studying to have a degree and be-
coming someone. I alwayswanted to be a teacher, but
it was impossible. I had to fit and play my part, but
never as someone who wants to be successful and
happy. Today, I’m a post-op trans woman but no one
helped me. Maybe things will change one day.
Similar narratives of institutional misrecognition are
common to the vast majority of participants from either
Brazil and Thailand or the United Kingdom and Portugal.
Many advert that despite activist pressure there is still
little space for gender difference. For Nepali migrants,
a case which I analysed in greater depth, it became evi-
dent that the legal third-gender model limits individuals’
moral entitlement to affirm their gender and be publicly
recognized for who they are. The official gender classi-
fication system produces a fundamental disjunction be-
tween the moral and the legal sphere of recognition,
which is reinforced the more a particular third-gender
category artificially unifies a diverse group of individuals
who feel deprived of their own gender identity. Although
the Nepali case is exemplary, similar processes of reifi-
cation (even if differently manifested) are extensive to
other geographies across the globe.
The analysis of the Nepali case through the voices of
trans and gender-nonconforming Nepali individuals liv-
ing in Portugal and the United Kingdom permitted us
to further understand the workings of third-gender cat-
egories in practice (Schilt, 2018). More importantly, it
showed how gender classification systems tend to gen-
erate misrecognition. Firstly, the Others (or X, Diverse,
Indeterminate, for that matter) gender marker seems
complicit with the social divide between ‘us’ and ‘them,’
that is, between those who fit the norm (the ‘gender nor-
mals’ as pointed out by Garfinkel, 1967) and those who
break conventions of gender (the outcasts that need be-
ing controlled). As research already demonstrated (Nisar,
2018), third-gender categories do not necessarily chal-
lenge the patriarchal gender order. Reservations against
third-gender solutions are, therefore, understandable
given the limitations posed by this model to the expres-
sion of gender diversity.
Secondly, the conflation of a wide range of gender
subjectivities and experiences beneath a category that
only partially translates historical and cultural notions of
gendermultiplicity tends to erase gender variance.While
a process of reification of the third-gender is in place, the
distinction between non-binary western people and non-
western third-gender individuals is reinforced (Towle &
Morgan, 2006). In other words, the divide between the
‘west and the rest’ regains power enough to increasemis-
recognition at the global level.
5. Conclusion
By examining the Nepali case against the backdrop of
multiple legal and institutional developments aimed at
recognizing the right to gender difference, I showed that
misrecognition is an accomplice of every act of recogni-
tion. Firstly, because recognition takes different forms in
different spheres, which renders moral and legal recog-
nition inequivalent. In moral terms, individuals are en-
titled to gender self-determination, which means being
recognized for who they are and being able to self-elect
their own gender identity. In legal terms, although third-
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gender categories entail the possibility ofmoving beyond
binary schemes and being awarded rights as a gender
nonbinary or nonconforming person, they also impose
limits to the definition of gender. Secondly, following
Nancy Fraser, because institutional gender markers tend
to reify individual identity. In line with my initial argu-
ments, unable to do justice to moral entitlements, the
politics of legal recognition is, in this way, shown to have
both enabling and disabling effects. Hence, if transgen-
dering recognition is paramount, a critical approach to
the concept, as well as the practices and effects it pro-
duces, is fundamental.
While putting gender in a box remains (and will per-
haps be) a paradoxical (even if necessarily unavoidable)
endeavour, imagining a politics without gender cate-
gories seems difficult in current times. Despite all criti-
cal insight, reinventing recognition beyond the categori-
cal classification scheme of the identity model remains
a humongous political challenge. Nonetheless, when ap-
plied to the legal sphere of rights, the identity recog-
nition model inevitably generates misrecognition. From
this angle, recognition appears to be intrinsically para-
doxical, which creates a difficult challenge. For instance,
if gender were officially abolished, gender nonconform-
ing individuals would lack legal existence and state pro-
tection against discrimination. If gender were multiplied,
individuals would feel their identity distorted and nar-
rowed down. If gender were partially eliminated and par-
tially multiplied, the balance would be difficult. In all the
above solutions, to some degree, the right to difference
might clash with the model of identity recognition imple-
mented. As such, although recognition is vital and nec-
essary, the acknowledgement of its limitations is funda-
mental. How canwe thenmove towards amore effective
recognition beyond the gender binary?
If the battle between a no-gender utopia and themul-
tiplication of gender categories seems almost unsolvable,
one potential way out would imply redressing recogni-
tion and shifting from the identity model of recogni-
tion to practice. In this way, recognizing shared condi-
tions of subalternity (as in Fraser’s status model) could
be more promising. The prioritization of shared condi-
tions of oppression could eventually ensure that political
umbrella-terms were malleable enough to embrace dif-
ferent identities and claims. In any case, even if ‘things
are done with words,’ to paraphrase the landmark ex-
pression of J. L. Austin (1962), emphasizing practice is
important. While this solution follows Nancy Fraser’s sta-
tus model very closely, it is important emphasizing that
such a practice-based perspective (remembering the pri-
oritization of the ontoformativity of practice for trans-
sexual women by Connell, 2012) does not elude recog-
nition. Rather, it implies considering the dense web of
intersecting inequalities: not only between trans sub-
jects and cisgender normativity but also between dif-
ferent trans and gender-nonconforming people across
the globe.
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